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Transforming Talks: Public Dialogue About
Social Justice in a Post-9-11 Age
Margaret Chon1
To situate the following speeches in a tradition of philosophical and
political dialogue about social justice is to interrogate the question that each
speechwriter asks.  Professor Bond2  queries whether America should
embrace or reject multiculturalism while Professor Matsuda3  inquires, “Who
is excellent?” as she considers the values and meanings of affirmative action.
And lastly, Professor Zinn4  asks about the role of artists and other citizens in
a time of war.
These inquiries are profoundly important in an increasingly interconnected
world.  Answering each involves complex judgments offered by each of the
authors in his or her carefully informed and beautifully written opinion.
Moreover, these three transforming talks were given during a time of
considerable transition from the pre—to the post—9-11 world.  We are acutely
aware of this historical period as an epoch, even as we live through it, and
epochs generate their own kinds of questions.5
In this introduction, therefore, I ask three questions about these three rather
different yet compelling talks.  First is the question of public dialogue: What
do these speeches reveal to us about the power and purpose of public dia-
logue?  Second is the question of social justice: What do they tell us about
the ways and means of achieving social justice?  Overarching is the question
of national, indeed global, crisis: What role do these three American intellec-
tuals play in this epoch of the “war” against terrorism?
PUBLIC DIALOGUE: FROM SOCRATES TO AUNG SAN SUU KYI
What do the three speeches published here reveal to us about the nature of
public dialogue?  The personal consequences of questioning other people’s
assumptions can be profound, as both the Greek philosopher, Socrates,6  and
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the Burmese political activist, Aung San Suu Kyi,7  discovered.  The raw
power of asking questions is something that can unnerve and disturb
listeners who prefer the false unity of a surface consensus because, in effect,
it is far easier to live with one’s assumptions and values unchallenged rather
than unmasked.  Moreover, at the extreme, forcing public dialogue on others
can result in a speaker’s exile or imprisonment, as in the case of Suu Kyi, or
even death, as in the case of Socrates.
Yet a version of the oral Socratic method—prematurely truncated in the
marketplace of Athens—is carried on as a live tradition in the law school
classrooms of America.   And the powerful non-violent tactics of slain
American civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or of the Indian
independence movement leader, Mohandas Gandhi, are emulated in the
current political stance of Nobel laureate Suu Kyi.8   As these examples show,
engaging in public dialogue about controversial subjects results in the
creation and maintenance of important cultural legacies.  Whether national
or global, our common culture is not a given.  Rather, it is the outcome of
vigorous, even impassioned, private and public debate to affirm our com-
monalities as well as to mediate our differences.  Moreover, the virtue of
simplicity in monologic or totalitarian thinking is far outweighed by the vice
of suppressing diversity or pluralism.  Suffice it to say, the cultural legacy of
dialogue resides not so much in the content that is the outcome of our
dialogue, as it is in the process of dialoguing.  More than most other disci-
plines, law is conscious of the substance-procedure distinction,9  and it is this
awareness of the significance of procedure that lies at the core of dialogue.10
Interpreting the “culture wars” in American universities during the 1980’s
and 1990’s, University of Chicago literature professor Gerald Graff states
that “one way to describe the conflict . . . , then, is to say that theory has
broken out.  ‘Theory’ . . . is what erupts when what was once silently agreed
to in a community becomes disputed, forcing its members to formulate and
defend assumptions that they previously did not even have to be aware of.”11
If there is anything that these three speeches exemplify, it is that public dia-
logue generates theory.  And theory, by its very nature, generates conflict.
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Conflict does not necessarily mean armed conflict.  However, it could and
definitely should mean greater epistemological awareness and tolerance for
other perspectives.12
Dialogue occurs when people are involved in a comparative endeavor to
understand self-reflectively not only their own locations in the world (or, as
postmodernist theorists would say, their own subject positions) but also their
locations relative to others.  Whether we agree to agree, or agree to disagree,
any conscious choice presumes that we know where we stand with respect to
others and why.  And by analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle,13
truth is something that is inevitably influenced by our own subject positions.14
Accordingly, those engaged in dialogue must exercise humility in the face of
the knowledge of others.  We must not fear the conflicts that dialogue engen-
ders because these conflicts are precisely what we need to learn to live with
others in a multicultural world.
The power and purpose of public dialogue is apparent in Professor Bond’s
claim that “America has always faced an enduring challenge: how to encour-
age the enriching aspects of America’s ethnic and racial diversity while
simultaneously moderating the divisive tendencies of that same diversity.”15
It is present in Professor Matsuda’s enumeration of the skill-set necessary to
function in a multicultural world: “First, an understanding that difference
exists . . . . Second, an understanding of subordination—that difference is
used to distribute power . . . . Third, a basic set of practices for effective
dealings across cultures . . . . Finally, the tools of a change agent . . . .”16   And
it is conveyed from Professor Zinn’s observation that “there have been acts
of terrorism going on throughout the world for a long time.  I bring that up
not to minimize or diminish the terror of what happened in New York and
Washington, but to enlarge our compassion beyond that.  Otherwise, we will
never understand what happened or what we must do about it.”17
As educators, what the three speechwriters in this volume thus share is
this perhaps utopian view that public dialogue and education will result in
better understanding and therefore improved social conditions.  Whether
libertarian or left-progressive, the writers are firmly embarked on the
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Enlightenment project of human progress.  Although they are not dialoguing
directly with each other, they each chose public forums to promote greater
cultural conversation about important issues of the day.18   Thus, this issue
could be viewed as part of a larger cultural conversation about social justice,
about which the next section elaborates.
SOCIAL JUSTICE: PUBLIC DIALOGUE IN PRAXIS
Like any other term of importance, social justice is a contested one.19
Yet, as argued above, the process of discussing what social justice means is
an important component of its ultimate substantive definition.20   Just as race
can be viewed profitably as a verb rather than a noun,21  social justice is far
more accurately conceptualized as a dynamic social process rather than a
static result.  This section thus asks: What do these speeches tell us about the
ways and means of achieving social justice?
Neo-conservative Michael Novak has offered what he terms an “ideo-
logically neutral” definition of social justice:
Social justice rightly understood is a specific habit of justice that is
“social” in two senses.  First, the skills it requires are those of
inspiring, working with, and organizing others to accomplish
together a work of justice. . . .
The second characteristic of “social justice rightly understood”
is that it aims at the good of the city, not at the good of one agent
only. . . . Hence the second sense in which this habit of justice is
“social”: its object, as well as its form, primarily involves the good
of others.22
Although I would argue that there is no such thing as an ideologically neu-
tral term, I understand Novak to mean that this definition skirts the divisive
question of what should be done about the unequal distribution of power,
wealth, and resources between rich and poor, white and non-white, male and
female, and so on.
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Taking Novak’s view as a starting point, all three talks fall under the genre
of social justice because they are about “working with . . . others” for the
“good of the city.”  They all question the relationship of the individual to
community, although each offers a distinctly different view of the good of
the community.  However, the dialogue about social justice does not stop
there.  If one is concerned with the distributional inequities within the com-
mon good, then it is not enough to work with others for the common good.
Indeed, it then becomes imperative to ask questions about and perform so-
cial justice according to the measure of whether each person’s share of the
common good is consistent with minimum standards of human dignity.23
This is the point of departure between Novak and others within the tradition
of Catholic social thought,24  for example, or in this volume, between Profes-
sor Bond and Professor Matsuda, or between Professor Zinn and his critics
at the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA),25  discussed in the
next section.  Some who dialogue about social justice seem to view the status
quo as acceptable, while others are not so sure about “conservatives [who]
are so anxious to conserve.”26   As discussed in the above section, it is the
purpose of dialogue to uncover elisions and distinctions among those who
are otherwise engaged in a common effort, so as to reinforce the common
bonds while acknowledging inevitable differences.  It is instructive to look
at the discussion about social justice both here and elsewhere as an example
of public dialogue in praxis.  Thus, if we step beyond Novak’s minimalist
social justice definition, we may approach social justice with theories of
equality as well as commonality.27   One possible alternative definition of
social justice is
that branch of the virtue of justice that moves us to use our best
efforts to bring about a more just ordering of society—one in which
people’s needs are more fully met.  It . . . is something due from
everyone whose efforts can make a difference to everyone whose
needs are not met as things stand.  I do not owe the man on the grate
a place to live, but I do owe him whatever I can do to provide a
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social order in which housing is available to him.  I do not owe any
poor person a share of my wealth, but I owe every poor person my
best effort to reform the social institutions by which I am enriched
and he or she is impoverished.28
This statement focuses more squarely on distributional concerns that
are at the heart of many theories of social justice.  For as political philoso-
pher David Miller has argued, even under a deserts-based system of
social justice,
[i]f we want our society to be egalitarian, then we will try to shape
our distributive practices so that the emergence of hierarchy is
discouraged; in particular, we will try to avoid the emergence of
large-scale, cumulative inequalities of advantage that make it
difficult for people to live together on terms of equality, even if
politically they are all defined as equals.29
Both Bond and Matsuda profess an interest in equality as well as
commonality, yet they disagree vigorously about the equality inherent in the
status quo.  One way of understanding the difference in their social justice
theories is by reference to materiality.  By adhering to a theory of American
exceptionalism,30  Bond assumes that our republican form of government
naturally and inevitably includes dialogue among all interested parties.  In
his view, multiculturalism does not require anything more than what
Americans have always done.
Matsuda, on the other hand, assumes that the material consequences of
any theoretical approach matter and thus focuses on those voices that are
absent from the national dialogue because they are both materially and
politically disenfranchised.  Indeed, the questions raised by Matsuda in her
speech reprise her adoption of the anti-subordination principle: “a deliberate
choice to see the world from the standpoint of the oppressed”31  for insight
into the normative direction of social change.  Listening to the silences,32
like looking to the bottom,33  involves dialogue with people who are typi-
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cally left out: the exploited, the marginalized, the powerless,34  the cleaning
woman who “pays taxes that fund the university.”35   The genesis of the
modern convenience store is Matsuda’s metaphor for the better world that
can result if we listen to those who are generally not heard.
Another way of understanding the theoretical differences between Bond
and Matsuda is by reference to structuralism.  Bond celebrates the indi-
vidualism within our larger national identity,36  echoing Justice Scalia’s view
that “We are just one race here.  It is American.”37   Matsuda, on the other
hand, cannot imagine individuals without groups and views identity (includ-
ing racial identity) politics as an important means of mapping and then
negotiating a multicultural world.38   This view is echoed in Justice Stevens’s
view that the current Supreme Court simplistically “would disregard the
difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”39   Regard-
less of which perspective one has in this public dialogue, the question of
social justice is a live debate,40  as the contemporaneous creation of these
two speeches makes clear.
PUBLIC DIALOGUE ABOUT SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A POST-9-11 WORLD
Finally, we reach the question of what role American intellectuals should
play in this post 9-11 epoch of the “war” against terrorism?  This question is
best answered here by examining both Professor Zinn’s speech on the role of
artists and citizens in wartime along with the general attack on academics,
including Zinn, by ACTA.
Professor Zinn is best known as the left-progressive historian who wrote
The People’s History of the United States: 1492 to the Present, in which he
argues that those who were historically disempowered and disenfranchised
played a very important role in the making of America as we know it today.
Focusing on the perspectives of indigenous peoples, women, slaves, and
labor movements, among other groups, his book has had broad influence
outside of his field.41
ACTA is less well-known.  This organization was founded in 1995 by
Senator Joseph Lieberman, who is also a former Democratic vice-presidential
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candidate, and vice-presidential spouse Lynne Cheney, who is also the former
head of the National Endowment for the Humanities.42   A recent report is-
sued under the auspices of ACTA, entitled Defending Civilization: How Our
Universities are Failing America and What Can Be Done About It,43  lists
117 incidents between September 11 and mid-November 2001 that pur-
portedly illustrate how American academics are undermining American
values of “democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and mutual toler-
ance.”44   Essentially, ACTA’s report alleges that American academics are
unpatriotic.45   According to Ms. Cheney, quoted in the report, the remedy
for this patriotic absence is to give added emphasis to teaching American
history from kindergarten to college.46
There is no small irony in the fact that a report recommending an increased
focus on American history education should criticize an American historian
who is responsible for increasing popular debate about and interest in
American history.  Zinn is accused by ACTA of being unpatriotic: for speak-
ing out publicly against the massive militarization that has followed the events
of September 11, specifically, for stating that “our security can only come by
using our national wealth, not for guns, planes, and bombs, but for the health
and welfare of our people, and for people suffering in other countries.”47
Again, it is instructive to examine this encounter as a process of public
dialogue about social justice.  Like the differences in theoretical locations
between Professors Bond and Matsuda, it is important to pinpoint where Zinn
and ACTA diverge in their respective theories.  What are the assumptions
that they share and the ones they do not?
Clearly, both share the important assumption that education matters and
that education about history, in particular, matters a lot.  However, Zinn
assumes that education about history is one that is critical and not just
received, one that accounts for a pluralism of viewpoints rather than reflect-
ing a unitary perspective, one that is formed through a process of mutually
respectful dialogue instead of unilateral cooptation.48
ACTA evidently promulgates the notion that multiculturalism is divisive
and wrong.  According to the group’s mission statement, it exists to “help
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meet the challenges facing higher education—from political intolerance and
speech codes to declining academic standards . . . .”49   The ACTA report
seems to assume that no dialogue needs to occur on “how and why this
nation was founded, and of the continuing relevance and urgency of its first
principles.”50   Instead, it assumes that these founding principles are a given.
This theoretical debate between traditionalists and multiculturalists within
the universities for at least the last twenty years51  takes on a new urgency in
the context of national and international crisis.  Americans have been told
that we are fighting against terrorism.  However, what exactly is it that
Americans are fighting for?  This, again, is a point of contestation.
The speech by Professor Zinn published here states that “[o]f course,
everyone praises the Declaration [of Independence] when it is hung up on a
classroom wall, but not when people read it and understand it.”52   This brings
to mind earlier speeches, such as by Frederick Douglass on The Meaning
of the July Fourth for the Negro, in which he declaims: “What, to the American
slave, is your 4th of July?  I answer; a day that reveals to him, more than all
other days in the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the
constant victim.”53   The meanings of patriotism, of loyalty, and of adherence
to American principles of democracy, human rights, individual liberty, and
mutual tolerance indeed depend very much upon who is speaking and what
is being said.  As Zinn asserts in this issue, for some, “[i]n reality, to criticize
the government is the highest act of patriotism.”54  Indeed, Zinn has had
a profound effect on the critical thinking of high school students such as
this high school junior who wrote the following essay in response to
September 11:
It is true that our enemies are far from perfect, but if we remove the
rose-colored glasses that we so avidly use to reflect on ourselves
and our lifestyles, as well as on our convictions and morals, we may
see a different picture than that of which we have been taught. For
instance, we may view the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan as
inhumane and cruel, but to be fair to ourselves and to the rest of the
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world, we must also investigate U.S. foreign policies in Latin
America, especially during the Carter and Reagan administrations.
The governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, installed and backed
by the United States government, are prime examples of inhumane
dictatorships, worthy of the reputation that the Taliban have received.
Although we are rightfully appalled at the degrading and harmful
treatment of women in Afghanistan and other religious states, we
should be equally disturbed by the massacre in El Mezote by the
Salvadoran military (who, incidentally, were trained at the School
of Americas), in which an entire village, innocent of any political
affiliation, was massacred, burned, and buried. Furthermore, we may
also inspect the Cerezo government in Guatemala, also supported
by the U.S., who educated the indigenous people of the country by
leaving the body parts of leftist revolutionaries around the streets of
the cities for all to see. If we compare U.S. clients’ human [rights]
abuses to those of the religious governments in the Middle East, we
see that to criticize the Taliban for their treatment of women would
at this point be hypocritical . . . . 55
According to this student, the role of the citizen is to
reflect on our own history of foreign policies in order to get an idea
of what, exactly, we are denouncing. In many cases, we will find
that we are denouncing atrocities that we (the United States)
ourselves have committed or supported in many countries across
the world. I will further suggest that it is our responsibility as
Americans to learn about and understand basic United States
foreign policy issues from a centrist viewpoint, in that we may then
make our judgements free of influence from the U.S. government,
media, or other biased sources (including historians, intellectuals,
and general outraged citizens). I am not attacking the American
public in this statement. I know, as an American, that the 9-11
attacks were both tragic and provocative, and that the atrocity
Transforming Talks: Public Dialogue About Social Justice in a Post-9-11 Age 23
cannot be ignored. I also know, as an American, that this country is
morally capable of much more than death and destruction in the
name of revenge. Perhaps, if we are educated and determined
enough, we may save the world rather than destroy it.56
While the negative consequences of public dialogue may include censure
(if not exile or death) from those who are uncomfortable with pluralism, the
positive consequences are related to the best and most fragile quality of
America: the freedom and ability to tolerate, indeed encourage, civic dia-
logue and dissent about issues that affect us all.  In America, unlike ancient
Greece or present-day Burma, more and more voices can and should be
encouraged to speak out in order that we may have a greatest palette possible
of ideas and actions with which to create a more socially just world.
Especially in this post 9-11 age, public dialogue about issues of social
justice can and should no longer be avoided.  American intellectuals and
their counterparts in other countries have an important leadership role in
demonstrating the responsible use of academic freedom, free speech, and
public activism.  This is not a burden to be undertaken lightly.  The three
speeches published in this inaugural issue of the Seattle Journal for Social
Justice provide just such an opportunity to engage with viewpoints different
from our own and to grapple with the comparative learning that results.
However, whether this journal continues to publish transforming talks by
engaged intellectuals like these depends on the vigilance of those who
understand the profound significance of preserving public dialogue about
social justice in a post-9-11 age.  For “[i]f justice is to describe what we owe
others we must first determine who we are to one another.  And if justice is
to be the measure of moral communities, we must decide how rich and full
these communities need to be.”57   It is only through the sharing of view-
points, the examination of starting points, and the consensus towards
endpoints that we will be able to survive together in our increasingly
interconnected world.
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1
 Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law.  I would like to thank the
editorial board of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for inviting me to share my per-
spectives in this inaugural issue.  I would also like to thank Professor Gary Chamberlain
and Professor Erik Olsen for bringing to my attention materials about social justice, as
well as the Wismer Diversity Professors Jeanette Rodriguez and Kellye Testy for
their support.
2
  James E. Bond served as the dean of Seattle University School of Law from 1986 to
1993, and from 1995 to 2000.  Professor Bond currently teaches at Seattle University
School of Law and currently holds the position of University Professor.  He has also
taught at the Judge Advocate General’s School, Washington and Lee University, Wake
Forest University, and in CLEO Institutes at the Universities of South Carolina and
Richmond.  He is the author of many legal articles and five books, including No Easy
Walk to Freedom: Reconstruction and the Ratification of the 14th Amendment.
3
  Mari J. Matsuda is a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center.  She
has also taught at the University of California at Los Angeles School of Law, the
University of Hawai‘i School of Law, Stanford Law School, and the University of
Hiroshima.  Professor Matsuda has written many well-known articles on constitutional
law and jurisprudential issues such as hate speech, affirmative action, and feminist theory.
Her books include Called from Within; Words that Wound; Where is Your Body? and
Other Essays on Race, Gender and the Law; and We Won’t Go Back, Making a Case for
Affirmative Action.
4
  Howard Zinn is a distinguished historian, professor, political theorist, social activist,
playwright, and author.  He has taught at Spelman College and Boston University.  He
has also been a history fellow at Harvard University and a visiting professor at the
University of Paris and the University of Bologna.  Professor Zinn has authored over
twenty books and plays.  His seminal book, A People’s History of the United States: 1492
to Present, is widely used in college classrooms.
5
 Howard Zinn, Artists and Citizens in a Time of War, 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 51, 51 (2002).
As Howard Zinn writes here, “There are certain historical moments when learning is
more compressed and intense than others.  The time after September 11 is one of those
moments.”
6
  Greek philosopher Socrates (circa 470–399 B.C.) is credited with developing the philo-
sophical thought concerned with the analysis of the character and conduct of human life.
He is famous for his injunction “know thyself” and is remembered for his conviction on
charges of impiety and subsequent death by drinking poisonous hemlock.
7
  Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (1945– ) is the leader of the nonviolent National League for
Democracy in Burma.  She is the daughter of the martyred first president of Burma, who
was under house arrest from 1989 to 1995.  She was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
1991 for her reform efforts.
8
 See AUNG SAN SUU KYI, FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND OTHER WRITINGS (Michael Aris
ed., 1995).
9
 KARL LLEWELYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 26–27 (Paul Gewirtz ed., 1989).
Moreover, law is the situs of stylized dialogues in the service of conflict resolution and in
certain ways provides a model for civil discourse.
10
 By this I do not mean to suggest that procedural justice is the sole criterion of social
justice.  Rather, as David Miller explains:
there is indeed a justice of procedures that can be identified independent of the
outcomes to which these procedures lead; and it is an important requirement of
social justice that a society’s institutions and practices should comply with this.
In most cases, however, outcomes can also be judged as just or unjust indepen-
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dent of the procedures that gave rise to them, and so one main quality that we
will look for in procedures is precisely that they should be well calculated to
produce just results.
DAVID MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 94 (1999).
11
 GERALD GRAFF, BEYOND THE CULTURE WARS: HOW TEACHING THE CONFLICTS CAN
REVITALIZE AMERICAN EDUCATION 52–53 (1992).
12
 As Graff notes:
Instead of choosing between the Western Conrad[’s Heart of Darkness] and
the non-Western Achebe[’s Things Fall Apart], I teach the conflict between
their novels and between competing views of literature. . . . When I had taught
Conrad’s novel as a universal statement, my students seemed to find the con-
cept of universality difficult and elusive—or perhaps they simply could not see
the point of insisting on it.  Again, “Universality as opposed to what?” seemed
to be their unspoken thought.  Once I introduced Achebe, however, with his
sharp challenge to the idea that Conrad’s world view is the universal one, the
concept of universality came into much clearer focus for my students.  The
‘Western’ aspect of Conrad suddenly became a less mystifying quality now
that students had something to contrast it with.  This led in turn to the question
of whether “Western” and “non-Western” are really mutually exclusive.
Id. at 33.  Cf. EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 19–31(1993) (discussing Two
Visions of Heart of Darkness).  Professor Said explains:
As we look back at the cultural archive, we begin to reread it not univocally,
but contrapuntally, with a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan
history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together
with which) the dominating discourse acts.
Id. at 51.  He also remarks:
On the one hand when in a celebrated essay Chinua Achebe criticizes [Josef]
Conrad’s racism, he either says nothing about or overrides the limitations placed
on Conrad by the novel as an aesthetic form.  On the other hand, Achebe shows
that he understands how the form works when, in some of his own novels, he
rewrites—painstakingly and with originality—Conrad.
Id. at 76.
13
  The Uncertainty Principle was formulated by German physicist Werner Heisenberg in
1927 and was significant in the development of quantum mechanics.  The Principle states
that it is impossible to precisely specify both the position and momentum of a particle
simultaneously.  In addition, the Principle states that a more accurate determination of
one quantity will cause a less precise measurement of another.
14
 Graff writes:
I now had to recognize that I had been teaching an interpretation of the text,
one that was shaped by a certain theory that told me what was and what was
not worth noticing and emphasizing in my classroom.  I had been unable to see
my theory as a theory because I was living so comfortably inside it.
GRAFF, supra note 11, at 29–30.
15
 James E. Bond, Multiculturalism: America’s Enduring Challenge, 1 Seattle J. Soc.
Just. 59, 59 (2002).
16
 Mari J. Matsuda, Who is Excellent?, 1 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 29, 29 (2002).
17
 Zinn, supra note 5, at 55.
18
 Professor James E. Bond, Address at Seattle University (Oct. 9, 2001); Professor Mari
J. Matsuda, Keynote Address, National Conference on Race and Ethnicity in American
Higher Education (May 31, 2001); Professor Howard Zinn, Massachusetts College of Art
(Oct. 10, 2001).
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19
 MILLER, supra note 10, at 21 (“We need theories . . . because of uncertainty and
disagreement about what justice requires of us.”).  See generally JAMES P. STERBA, SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: CLASSICAL WESTERN TEXTS IN FEMINIST AND MULTICULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 1998).
20
 Patrick McCormick, That They May Converse: Voices of Catholic Social Thought, 42
CROSS CURRENTS 521, 522 (1992–93) (“For if recent developments in Catholic social
thought have taught us anything, it is that a sustained and civil conversation (and
argumentation) is the sound of justice.”).
21
 As Michael Omi and Howard Winant explain:
The effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and ‘decentered’
complex of social meaning constantly being transformed by political struggle.
With this in mind, let us propose a definition: race is a concept which signifies
and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of
human bodies.
MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960S
TO THE 1990S 55 (2d ed. 1994).
22
 Michael Novak, Defining Social Justice, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2000, at 11, 13,
http://print.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0012/opinion/novak.html.
23
 David Hollenbach writes:
the [Catholic Social] tradition claims that membership in the human com-
munity creates a bond between persons sufficient to ground a right for all to
share in the public good to the minimum degree compatible with human
dignity.  Distributive justice thus is the norm which states the obligation of
society and the state to guarantee this participation by all in the common good.”
Social justice “concerns institutionalized patterns of mutual action and inter-
dependence which are necessary to bring about the realization of distributive
justice. . . .  Citizens have a personal obligation, . . . [i.e.,] concern for concrete
needs of all persons and for the creation of reciprocal interdependence.  Social
justice also states the obligation of the state both to promote distributive
justice and to make those legal claims on all citizens which are entailed by
this task.
David Hollenbach, S.J., Modern Catholic Teachings Concerning Justice, in THE FAITH
THAT DOES JUSTICE 207, 220 (John C. Haughey ed., 1977).
24
 McCormick, supra note 20.  I focus on the Catholic tradition of social justice not
because it is the definitive version of social justice, but because it has developed a litera-
ture and praxis that offers many insights.  See William J. Byron, S.J., Ten Building Blocks
of Catholic Social Teaching, AM., Oct.  31, 1998, at 9; Catholic Social Teaching, A Catholic
Framework for Economic Life, available at http://www.osjspm.org/cst/10points.htm
(Nov. 1996).
25
 JERRY L. MARTIN & ANNE D. NEAL, AM. COUNCIL OF TRS. AND ALUMNI, DEFENDING
CIVILIZATION: HOW OUR UNIVERSITIES ARE FAILING AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT
IT 16 (2001) (critiquing Zinn’s comment: “[O]ur security can only come by using our
national wealth, not for guns, planes, and bombs, but for the health and welfare of our
people, and for people suffering in other countries,” quoted by James Bowman, Towers of
Intellect, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2001, at W17).  After the initial distribution, ACTA then
reissued the report without attributions to the quotations such as Zinn’s.  For the full text
including attributions, see ACTA, Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Fail-
ing America and What Can be Done About It, available at http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/
~aaron/defciv.pdf.
Transforming Talks: Public Dialogue About Social Justice in a Post-9-11 Age 27
26
 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas from a Federal
Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1005, 1018 (1992).
27
 Hollenbach notes:
All three [forms of justice] contain an egalitarian core: equal claims to mutual
freedom and fidelity to contracts in the case of commutative justice, equal rights
to mutual participation in the public good in the case of distributive justice,
and equal obligation to aid in the creation of social and political structures for
participation and mutuality in the case of social justice.
Hollenbach, supra note 23, at 221.  See also MILLER, supra note 10, at 242–43.
28
 Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Social Justice and Liberation, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619,
620–21 (1996).
29
 MILLER, supra note 10, at 242.
30
 Bond, supra note 15, at 69 (“Our continuing commitment to that creed makes us unique
among nations; it makes us a propositional nation.”).
31
 MARI J. MATSUDA, WHERE IS YOUR BODY? AND OTHER ESSAYS ON RACE, GENDER AND THE
LAW 8 (1997).
32
 Matsuda, supra note 16, at 29.
33
 Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
34
 IRIS MARION YOUNG, The Five Faces of Oppression, in READINGS FOR DIVERSITY AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 35, 36– 49 (2000).
35
 Matsuda, supra note 16, at 31.
36
 Id.  Bond, supra note 15, at 68.
37
 Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).  Cf. Bond, supra note 15, at 69 (“This ‘strange mixture of blood,’
said Crevecour, was found ‘in no other country’ and constituted what he called ‘this new
race of men.’”).
38
 Matsuda, supra note 16, at 37 (“I would like to close these remarks by discussing a
form of resistance called, in the theory world, the critique of identity politics.”).  See
ROBERT S. CHANG, Politics After the Fall of the Essential Subject, in DIS-ORIENTED: ASIAN
AMERICANS, LAW AND THE NATION-STATE 128 (1993).  There is a huge literature on identity
politics, and as Professor Matsuda has noted, critiques come from both the left and the
right.  Left critiques of identity politics are answered also by Professor Robert Chang’s




 Educating for Justice: What Does it Mean for Seattle University?, BROADWAY &
MADISON (Seattle University, Seattle, WA), Sept. 10, 2001, at 1.  As Seattle University
President Stephen V. Sundborg said:
I don’t believe it is critical to define justice, nor is that our purpose.  I believe
that if you cling too narrowly to a definition, you exclude those with different
visions.  I also believe a university is not defined by the answers it provides,
but by the questions it asks.  I want students, faculty and staff members at
Seattle University to be so in contact with the world as it really is—the




 A recent Westlaw search reveals sixty-four citations to this book in law reviews and
other texts and periodicals.
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE28
42
 Bill Berkowitz, Lynne Cheney’s Campus Crusade: Second Lady’s ACTA Launches Cam-
paign against ‘Blame America First’ Academics, at http://www.workingforchange.com/
article.cfm?ItemID=12355 (Nov. 19, 2001) (on file with the Seattle Journal of Social
Justice).
43
 MARTIN & NEAL, supra note 25.
44
 Id. at 5.
45







 Zinn, supra note 5.  See also Interview by Sharon Basco with Hugh Gusterson,
Assistant Professor of Anthropology, MIT, Lynn Cheney’s Free Speech Blacklist: Spin-
ning Tolerance and Diversity as Harmful Dissent, available at http://www.tompaine.com/
feature.cfm?ID=4688 (Jan. 5, 2002).  As stated by Professor Hugh Gusterson, another
academic reviled in the ACTA report, “The role and purpose of the university in America
is not to cheer-lead for whatever the chosen policy of the American government is.  The
role and purpose of the university is to peruse knowledge and to encourage people to
think critically.”
49
 Berkowitz, supra note 42, at ¶ 15.
50
 MARTIN & NEAL, supra note 25, at 7.
51
 GRAFF, supra note 11, at 52 (documenting Ms. Cheney’s tenure at the NEH as one that
consistently promoted a “‘conflict-free’ idea of culture.”).  Graff  states,
Whereas this conflict-free idea of culture once held a privileged place in
humanistic education as something that went without saying, it has now
become one theory among others, something that you have to argue for against
competing theories.  This is what most bothers [the traditionalists]: that the
literary canon, once seen as an accepted heritage to be noiselessly passed from
one generation to the next, has become a conflict of theories.
See also id. at 20, 93, 108, 121, 165, 167, 195.
52
 Zinn, supra note 5, at 54.
53
 RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 106–07 (Juan
Perea et al. eds., 2000).  Mr. Douglass declaimed:
To him, your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty, an unholy license;
your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty
and heartless; your denunciation of tyrants, brass fronted impudence; and your
shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mockery . . . . Fellow citizens, I will not
enlarge further on your national inconsistencies.  The existence of slavery in
this country . . . destroys your moral power abroad.
See also Higginbotham, Jr., supra note 26, at 1012–14 (describing Justice Clarence
Thomas’s negative response to Justice Thurgood Marshall’s critical understanding of
the Constitution).
54
 Zinn, supra note 5, at 53.
55
 Nick Diamond, Reflection on the War in Afghanistan and General U.S. Foreign Policy




 Patrick McCormick, Whose Justice? (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Seattle
Journal for Social Justice).
